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ABSTRACT 
Public services in Italy have undergone a deep transformation over the past two 
decades. A major watershed was first reached with privatization and then by listing in 
the stock market of some municipal companies that had been providing in-house 
services for almost a century. These companies then underwent major restructuring, 
through mergers and acquisitions, investments in relatively new activities, and in 
some cases internationalization. The article provides a preliminary assessment of 
Italy’s turning towards the French model of industrialization, based on the 
involvement of big multinationals in public services, tracing commonalities and 
differences as a result of isomorphic dynamics. Empirical focus is on companies and 
their relationships with the political sphere, through the analysis of key aspects of 
governance and strategic decision-making of ACEA, HERA and IREN in Italy and SUEZ 
ENVIRONNEMENT and VEOLIA in France. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
Industrialization through corporatization has represented a major policy goal in the 
restructuring of public services in Europe, both at the national and at the local level 
(Wollmann, Marcou 2010; Grossi and Reichard 2008; Thynne 1998; Bognetti and 
Oberman 2012). With reference to Italy, former Prime Minister Romano Prodi 
argued in the early Nineties that stronger private actors and larger companies were 
needed to compete in liberalized markets in Europe (Prodi 1992, 851). Although this 
was referred mostly to the privatization of state-owned enterprises, it also addressed 
problems that were pressing in local public services, the provision of water to begin 
with. Here, there was a widespread view that the fragmentation of providers 
constituted a major flaw in the Italian system, especially when contrasted with the 
presence of larger firms in other European countries (Massarutto 1999; Boitani 
2005).  
One country where the process of industrialization has been successful and the 
centrality of the big companies in the provision of public services has been well 
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established is certainly France. Home of the two largest multinationals in the sector 
of public services, SUEZ ENVIRONNEMENT and VEOLIA, France had for long time a 
system of delegation that resembles, at least at first sight, the model chosen by Italian 
policy-makers in the Nineties for allocating the provision of several public services. 
As has been argued, however, the idea of French “model” is not so much linked to 
an administrative or contractual type of managing public services but it is rather 
related to the success of French transnational groups in that business (Petitet 2002, 
27). 
Looking at the Italian case, ideas and instruments included in the reforms of water 
services might have then paved the way for imitation of the French model, with the 
occurrence of isomorphism, intended as a constraining process that forces one unit 
to resemble other units that face the same environmental conditions in 
organizational fields (Di Maggio and Powell 1983, 148). To take into account the role 
of local politics and policy legacies in the implementation of water reforms in Italy 
(Lippi 2000; Lippi, Giannelli, Profeti, Citroni 2008), this article adopts a neo-
institutionalist perspective and looks for isomorphism in public utilities in order to 
provide insights into the process of industrialization of Italian public services, taking 
the French model as the reference point.  
Notwithstanding the differences between Italy and France in the timing of the 
industrialization of water services and in the industrial features of providers, there are 
similarities in the institutional asset, with municipalities being key actors in the 
provision of water services. The main research question of the article is to uncover 
the current status of the industrialization process as a policy goal (triggered by the 
Galli law in 1994) in the Italian case and to analyse the role of the policy legacies in 
determining similarities and differences between the French and the Italian 
experience. The article aims to show how actors’ configuration and policy legacies in 
the water sector (the stability of the service management model and the 
organizational features of firms) were a hurdle to a smooth process of change 
towards isomorphism for Italian public service providers from the very inception of 
the industrialization process (Grossi and Thomasson 2011; Thynne 2011; Hodge and 
Greeve 2009). 
In this article, the industrialization of the water sector will be described in relation to 
the development of the main firms in France and in Italy as the key actors. As a 
matter of fact, industrialization was an explicit policy goal in the reforms of Italian 
public services, to be developed through different strategies (see par. 2). By 
industrialization we mean a process of transformation in the production of public 
services. Namely, industrialization identifies the change towards a production 
function that decreases marginal costs, fosters scale economies and finally heads to 
firms’ dimensional growth (Citroni, Giannelli, Lippi 2008, 55-56). Though not 
necessary, in the Italian case this process was translated into different forms of 
privatization, either “formal” (namely “corporatization” in Grossi and Reichard 
2008) with municipal public enterprises being forced to transform into private firms 
or Società per Azioni (SPA), “patrimonial”, with the opening to private capitals, mergers 
with other firms and entry into the stock market and, finally “functional”, by 
accessing tendering in cases of competition for the market (Killian, Richter, Trapp, 
2007).  
Undoubtedly the issue is very complex, and one of the arguments of the paper is that 
the last decades actually saw an increase in complexity, considering both firms’ 
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organizational changes and sectors regulation. In order to deal with this complexity, 
we will focus on companies in the water sector following a two-fold rationale.  
First, this analytic choice is linked quite naturally to the spirit of the reforms that led 
to industrialization and privatization of public services in Italy while being consistent 
with the setup of the French system. Second, this perspective provides new empirical 
insights on an actor, the utility company, that often escaped the attention of political 
science and public policy, and that now plays a major role in devising and 
implementing policies.  
The institutional setting and firms’ strategic decisions (vertical and horizontal 
integration, M&A, internationalization) will be taken into account in tracking this 
process. Moreover, the relationship of these firms with national and local politics will 
be analysed in order to grasp the dynamic facet of change (Barraqué 2012). Policy 
legacies and actors’ configuration in Italian and French water systems will also be 
considered in order to assess convergence (and enduring divergence) in the two 
cases. The narratives shed light on the relevance of relationships between centre and 
periphery, the existence of transnational links among companies that restructure 
agency in relevant policy sectors, and the internal diversification of national models, 
where the mix between institutional reforms and political and economic realities 
allowed the emergence (or re-emergence) of very different models in the provision 
of public services.  
The article proceeds as follows. The next paragraph focuses on industrialization as a 
policy goal and on comparative institutional settings, briefly sketching the major 
institutional features of the Italian setting and reforms with reference to water 
provision. The third paragraph presents the key features of the French system, 
focusing on the “glocal” nature of French companies and on the way local 
government use available policy tools to increase their control in the policy process. 
The fourth paragraph describes the evolution of the main Italian former municipal 
companies (municipalizzate) to track the relationship between municipal government 
and their companies through the analysis of major organizational and strategic 
decisions. In both paragraphs, we focus on mergers and acquisitions and 
internationalization as observable strategies to show the mechanisms underlying 
divergences. The conclusions wrap up the major findings of the research and 
propose an assessment of the extent of convergence between the two systems. We 
argue that notwithstanding the fact that national models have been deeply de-
structured by both local and international pressures, convergence is affected by 
specific arrangements and persisting legacies in governance and organizational 
models. 
Empirical research is mostly based on extensive semi-structured interviews with 
shareholders’ representatives, managers and water experts both in Italy and France 
on the abovementioned strategic decisions (M&A and internationalization) as key 
dimensions of the industrialization process. 
 
 
2 
Changing public services in Italy: French-style industrialization? 
 
Industrialization through corporatization as a policy goal 
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The original models of water provision differed substantially between the two 
countries. In the French case (see also par. 3), the management through concession 
contracts and affermage (Lorrain 2008) allowed for the consolidation of strong 
industrial private players in the water sector that negotiated contracts with local 
politicians (Massarutto 2011, 146-147). The imitation of the industrial model of 
French firms took on particular features in the case of Italian firms and interacted 
with the policy legacies of the water system (Lippi, Giannelli, Profeti, Citroni 2008). 
Whereas the French model of water service provision developed through a relatively 
stable pattern in regulation and in governance modes, the management of water in 
Italy followed a tortuous path through reforms and resistances.  
The main institutional feature of the water service provision in Italy was the 
fragmentation of service providers at the local level, with the municipalities directly 
in charge of the management of service (Citroni, Giannelli, Lippi 2008). In the most 
industrialized urban areas, the aziende municipalizzate specialized not only in water but 
also in other sectors such as grids (public lighting, road maintenance), energy 
production and waste management. These represented the exception to the general 
pattern and carried out investments in water infrastructures more autonomously by 
using revenues from other services.  
In the Eighties, this pattern entered a deep crisis. Sewage and distribution networks 
needed large investments, which were constrained by the crisis of public finance. The 
traditional North-South divide deepened although cases of political corruption 
showed a lack of transparency in public works at the local level also in the North 
(Massarutto 2011, 47-50). Both policy-makers and experts considered the 
fragmentation of management and providers as the main policy problem and 
indicated industrialization as the more suitable solution to the deficiencies of the 
system of water provision (Carrozza 2008, 10). 
Industrialization had to be realized through various instruments, namely the 
transformation into private corporations, the expansion of the providers through 
their listing in the stock market, the operations of mergers and acquisitions and the 
planning of investments through a new multi level governance of water service 
provision originally based on regulation theories (Lippi, Giannelli, Citroni 2008).  
Privatization and New Public Managements-driven reforms aimed at changing 
organizational form, with the introduction of corporatization as a first step towards a 
more efficient and industrialized model of capitalism and of service provision 
(Christensen and Pallensen 2001; Gilardoni and Lorenzoni 2003; Sabbatini 2010, 58). 
The transformation of the former aziende municipalizzate from aziende speciali to joint 
stock companies with mixed and totally publicly owned joint stock corporations 
(SPA) was strongly enhanced by a number of regulative instruments2 and aimed at 
increasing efficiency through independence from politics (Cavaliere 2007, 235; 
Massarutto 2011, 56, 54).  
Moreover, at the sector level, the Galli law established a new governance structure  
(Lippi, Giannelli, Profeti, Citroni 2008; Carrozza 2008; Massarutto 2011), based on:  
a. the regulatory system, with a de jure separation of control (under the charge 
of local authorities through a local-based instrument of regulation, the 
                                                        
2 SPA could rely on tax allowances, direct award of concessions in case of public ownership, among 
others (law n. 127, 1997, so-called Bassanini bis). 
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Autorità di Ambito Territoriale Ottimale or AATO3 to plan investments and tariffs 
to be then implemented by providers) and provision (under the charge of the 
newly born corporations); 
b. the integrated management of the water process with providers incorporating 
all production phases, from abduction to distribution and clearing;  
c. the economic sustainability of the whole water system through the 
introduction of principles related to full-cost-recovery.  
 
Policy legacies vs. isomorphism 
 
The implementation of reforms has been often seen as a collection of unintended 
consequences and partial failures (Lippi, Giannelli, Profeti, Citroni 2008, 637; 
Massarutto 2011, 82-83; Citroni Lippi and Profeti 2012, 49). To introduce the 
description of convergence and divergence between industrialization processes in 
France and in Italy in a neo-institutional perspective, we will first focus on the firms’ 
regulatory environment and on the institutional setting after the reforms. Then, we 
will assess the extent of isomorphism (Di Maggio and Powell 1983). Common 
constraints to actors in the water sector could be due both to changes in regulation 
and to the creation of incentives to constitute SPA as a new organizational tool 
(Thynne 1998).  
While stability is typical of the French institutional setting and regulation (that is, 
change happens, but generally in the long term), the implementation of the 
regulatory design in Italy was contradictory and opened the way to regulatory 
uncertainties (Sabbatini 2010). In a first phase, the creation of the regulatory 
authorities at the local level was obstructed by disagreement among political 
representatives at different sub-national levels (Interview 1). More recently, the 
national government radically changed the regulatory design, first cancelling AATOs 
in 2009 (law 191, 2009), in response to a need for rationalization of public finance, 
then calling for regions to create a new single authority for the whole regional 
territory in order to restrain localism. 
The national government intervened in the procedures for awarding contracts. The 
introduction of compulsory competitive tendering (laws n. 135, 2009) was more pro-
liberalization and pro-privatization than recommended by the European Union, that 
in 1999 allowed for the in house award procedure in the case of publicly owned SPA 
under specific conditions (for Teckal sentence of the European Court of Justice, see 
Massarutto 2011, 56). The European Commission also intervened to challenge the 
uncertainties for competition on several transitory dispositions in relation to the 
prorogation of existing awards. 
In this process, conflict rose to the level of public debate as a referendum repealed 
existing rules on award procedures and investments in 20114. Since the referendum, 
regulative uncertainty has affected the policy even more deeply, notwithstanding 
recent intervention of the central government that delegated the Authority for the 
                                                        
3 Similarly, the law named the optimal water district Ambito Territoriale Ottimale, from now on ATO in 
the text (see Lippi et al 2008, 624-625). 
4 The referendum n. 1, 2011 involved the abolition of the compulsive tendering procedures set by art. 
23 bis, law 133, 2008 and the fixed amount of capital remuneration as a component of tariffs. 
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Regulation for Electricity and Gas (AEEG) for regulation of tariffs and control of 
quality in the water sectors (law n. 214, 2011).  
As far as the reduction of fragmentation is concerned, corporatization revealed its 
ambiguous role. Indeed, corporatization represented an opportunity for 
municipalities to resist the design of aggregation of service providers. The 
combination with other regulative provisions, such as the possibility to maintain 
more than one service provider in the same ATO, limited incentives to firm 
aggregation, thus weakening the objective of industrialization of the water sector 
(Citroni, Giannelli, Lippi 2008, 34).  
Another consequence of this process was the radical change in the role of local 
politics in service provision. While municipal councils experienced a loss of control 
and knowledge over local utilities (Roncoroni 2004, 241), mayors and executives now 
play different roles, being at the same time involved in the governance of firms as 
(often dominant) shareholders and in local authorities as regulators and planners. It 
can be argued that the implementation of reforms helped in creating fragmentation 
also at the institutional level, with a never-ending confrontation between central, 
municipal and regional governments that is be found in the French system. 
Thus, the implementation of water reforms has been characterized by deep 
regulatory uncertainty, and, at the same time, the policy legacy of fragmentation at 
the local level has resisted. This outcome is not homogenous: former municipalizzate 
in the biggest cities in the Centre-North of Italy were often consolidated through 
mergers and acquisitions, increasing their size while maintaining a multi-utility 
business model. Moreover, by considering the distribution of sector know-how as a 
component of the industrialization process, these firms gradually became more 
similar to the French case, where the concentration of industrial know-how in water 
and infrastructures is a typical feature of the organizational setup of national 
champions in the sector. 
 
«Tab. 1. Main facts and ownership structure of the main local utilities and of their “forefathers” (in 
italics) » 
Name 
Year of 
creation 
First 
year as a 
Spa 
First year 
in the 
Italian 
Stock 
Market 
Ownership structure in 2012 (or at time of 
mergers for forefathers) 
GDF SUEZ sa 2008 - - 
Agence de Participations de l’État: 36%; Groupe 
Bruxelles Lambert: 5,2%; Employees: 2,9%; Caisse 
des Dépôts et Consignations: 2%; GDF Suez sa: 
1,7%; CNP assurances: 1,1%; Sofina: 0,6%; Others 
<2%: 50,5%.   
VEOLIA 
ENVIRONME
NT sa 
1853 - - 
Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations: 9,30%; 
Groupe Industriel Marcel Dassault GIMD: 6,3%; 
Groupe Groupama: 5,42%; Velo Investments 
(Quatari Diar) 4,73%; EDF sa: 4,22%; Veolia 
Environment sa: 2,73%; Others <2%: 67,30%. 
ACEA spa 1909 1998 1999 
Municipality of Rome: 51,00%; GDF Suez: 
11,52%; Gruppo Caltagirone: 16,40%; Others 
<2%: 21,08% 
HERA spa 2002 2002 2003 
Municipality of Bologna 13,7%; Municipality of 
Rimini 2,2%; Municipality of Cesena 2,1%; 
Municipality of Ferrara 0,6%; HSST Spa 
(Munipalities of Modena): 12,5%; Con. Ami 8,8%; 
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Ravenna Holding 7,8%; Holding Ferrara Servizi 
S.r.l. 2,2%; Livia Tellus Governance spa 
(municipality of Forlì) 2,0%; Other Municipalities 
8,9%; Others <2%: 39,2%. 
AGEA spa – 
merged in HERA 
in 2004 
1964 2000 - Municipality of Ferrara: 100% 
META SpA – 
merged in HERA 
in 2005 
1997 1997 2001 
Comune di Modena: 63,6%; Comune di Castelfranco 
Emilia: 4,2% Comune di Pavullo: 2,3%; Finenergie: 
2,8% 
ACEGAS-APS 
spa – merged in 
HERA in dec 
2012 
1997 1997 2000 
Acegas-Aps Holding: 62,8%; Intesa Sanpaolo spa: 3,7%; 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Trieste: 5,1%; ING 
sa: 2,5%; Others <2% : 25,9%. 
IREN 
 SpA 
2010 2010 2010 
Finanziaria Sviluppo Utilities (owned by 
Municipalities of Turin and Genova): 35,96%; 
Municipality of Parma: 6,60%; Municipality of 
Reggio Emilia: 8,38%; Fondazione Cassa di 
Risparmio di Torino: 2,51%; Intesa Sanpaolo Spa: 
2,97%; Others< 2%: 43,58% 
AEM Torino 
SpA – merged 
with AMGA in 
IRIDE in 2006, 
now IREN 
1907 1997 2000 
Municipality of Turin 68,85%; Sanpaolo IMI spa: 
4,85%; Assicurazioni Generali spa: 4,39%; Fondazione 
Cassa di Risparmio di Torino: 2,01%;  Others <2%: 
19,9% 
AMGA spa – 
merged with 
AEM Torino in 
IRIDE spa in 
2006, now IREN 
spa 
1922 1995 1996 
Municipality of Genoa: 54%; Veolia Eau – Général des 
eaux spa: 17%; Impregilio spa: 5%;  Others <2%: 
24%. 
IRIDE spa – 
merger of AMGA 
into AEMT, now 
IREN spa 
2006 2006 2006 
FSU - Finanziaria Sviluppo Utilities (jointly owned by the 
municipality of Turin and Genoa): 57,6%; Intesa Sanpaolo 
spa: 4,7%; Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Torino: 
4%; Others <2%:33,7%.  
ENIA spa – 
merged in 2010 in 
IRIDE, now 
IREN 
2005 2005 2005 
Municipality of Reggio Emilia: 21,9%; Municipality of 
Parma: 17,3%; Municipality of Piacenza: 4.6%; Other 
Municipalities: 18,1%; Amber Capital LP: 2,8%; Ecofin 
Ltd: 2%; Pictet Asset Management Ltd: 2%; others <2%: 
31,3%. 
Source: Companies’ Annual Reports, various years; CONSOB dataset.  
 
In the following paragraphs, the cases of two French “national champions”, VEOLIA 
and SUEZ ENVIRONNEMENT, and of three Italian multi-utility firms, IREN, HERA and 
ACEA presented in table 1, will be analysed in order to better understand the nuanced 
picture of the evolution of big firms in water service provision and of their 
relationship with politics at different territorial levels. 
 
 
3 
The French model: big business and small politics?  
The emergence and evolution of national companies 
 
VEOLIA and SUEZ ENVIRONNEMENT constitute a constant presence around French 
villages, towns and cities. This presence is the outcome of a long process through 
which delegation in the management of water services took hold more by custom 
than by formal regulation (Guérin-Schneider and Lorrain 2003). This section 
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diachronically traces the way in which these companies managed business in France 
as well as looking at current structure and strategies.  
COMPAGNIE GÉNÉRALE DES EAUX (CGE) and LYONNAISE DES EAUX, ancestors 
respectively of VEOLIA and SUEZ ENVIRONNEMENT, started their activities in the 
second half of the Nineteenth century as providers of water services to increasingly 
populated urban environments where public finances alone had limited ability to 
enhance the existing infrastructures and new management techniques had to be 
developed and/or adapted to water services provision. This represents a first set of 
institutional arrangements in the sector, where long-term concession contracts with 
municipalities delegated to private companies investments in the assets and 
operations management (Pezon 2011). These companies were established from the 
very beginning as nation-wide companies: the largest and most enduring were the 
CGE, established in 1853 with an act by the Emperor Napoleon the Third as required 
for private corporations (Jacquot 2003), and the SOCIÉTÉ LYONNAISE DES EAUX ET 
DE L’ECLAIRAGE (SLEE), founded in 1880 by a large bank, the Credit Lyonnais.  
A second set of institutional arrangements, in the early part of the 20th century, is 
characterized by municipalities taking over control of water services. The scarce 
geographic extension of modern technologies in the sector due to limited profit 
margins for private companies created incentives for local authorities to act on their 
own, not without several conflicts with the companies that ended in administrative 
courts (Pezon 2011). As had been done in the past, large network infrastructures 
were realized through private companies, thereby increasing the number of users 
connected to the water network. The system of régies municipales that emerged, 
however, did not lead to the disappearance of private water companies, but rather to 
their transformation into sub-contractors in certain types of “design and build” 
activities (with reference, for instance, to hygiene and water quality) and providers of 
specific services such as early versions of customer management.  
The progression to the third phase, where the affermage develops as a key tool in the 
interaction between companies and municipalities (Lorrain 2008), is the outcome of 
transformation occurring after World War II. Here, in the water sector, as elsewhere, 
mixed public-private arrangements emerged: key investments in infrastructures are 
financed directly or indirectly through public funding (the system is described in the 
classic work of Zysman 1983). Private companies such as CGE largely benefited from 
this division of labour, together with increases in cash flows due to increasing water 
consumption. Together with consumption, the institutional arrangement of affermage 
contributed to the expansion of delegation both in percentage and in total number of 
users (Guérin-Schneider and Lorrain 2003). These revenues allowed in turn not only 
the financing of further investments in water but the expansion of private 
companies.  
 
Companies in constant becoming: Vertical integration, expansion, and divestitures 
Companies developed different organizational models over time. A key moment in 
this evolution is linked to the use of cash flows deriving from the increasing size of 
the water market. It has been observed how it is not just market growth but also 
market stability that have guaranteed wide opportunities for the development of CGE 
and SLEE (Defeuilley 2005). In a regulated market such as that regarding water 
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service provision, the knowledge that contracts tend to be renewed, that this 
consistency over time allows companies to develop skills that are only partially 
reproducible by other actors, the existence of durable relations with politicians and 
the economic agents (financial to begin with, as they know that they can rely on the 
stability of business) all play together in strengthening incumbents and creating 
competitive advantages. 
This long run perspective sheds light on investment strategies that had led to the 
restructuring of companies, which became quite different from their original 
versions. The process of expansion of the firms was both aimed at diversifying 
activities and to horizontally and vertically integrating their core business sector. 
With reference to the latter type of growth, one key acquisition by water companies 
has been in the sector of constructions, which was useful for water infrastructures. 
SLEE’s acquisition of DEGREMONT, an emerging private firm dealing with the 
production of drinking water and treatment of sewage that had operations extending 
abroad is a case in point. CGE already represented a vertically integrated company 
(SADE - SOCIÉTÉ AUXILIAIRE DES DISTRIBUTIONS D'EAU, dealing with water 
treatment, had already been created in 1918). In 1966, it also acquired shares of ODA 
(OMNIUM D’ASSAINISSEMENT), named OTV, a company specialized in the treatment 
of wastewater. Acquisition of other smaller private water companies also increased 
the market shares held by CGE and SLEE so that at the beginning of the century 
about 80 per cent of citizens were served by private companies, compared with less 
than 20 per cent in the pre-war period and 33 per cent in the early 50s5.   
More complex is the process of diversification of activities. From the Sixties, CGE 
and SLEE started acquiring companies in sectors that grew increasingly diverse over 
time. While maintaining networks and urban transport (being services with a strong 
link to local communities), wastewater treatment, residential heating and waste 
management represented activities where economies of scale with existing core 
competences were signalling a move away from core business. Following 
consolidation in the water market in the Eighties, with contracts having been won in 
major cities such as Lyon and Toulouse, CGE and SLEE continued to enter new 
market sectors, two of which included public works and infrastructures 
(BTP, bâtiment et des travaux publics) and media. In the first sector, SLEE merged with 
DUMEZ, while CGE acquired SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE D'ENTERPRISES (SGE), whereas in 
the media sector, CGE became the owner of media groups in the fields of 
telecommunications and television. This latter process, which began in the Eighties 
and skyrocketed in the mid-Nineties, signalled at least for CGE the shifting focus to 
new activities as the major core business, given the size assumed by media, transport, 
constructions and electricity, with the merge between the “heating” branch and an 
external company that gave birth to the DALKIA subsidiary within the company. 
Even the name of the new conglomerate, VIVENDI, metaphorically marks a departure 
from the original model. 
The outcome of this process was the creation of “blue-chip” companies whose 
nature of conglomerates with very diverse business units starkly contrasts with the 
                                                        
5 In 2001, CGE served 24.2 million people and SLEE 11.4 million people (out of a population of 60 
million). A third group active in water is SAUR, serving 6.2 million people. Data from Guérin-
Schneider and Lorrain 2003. 
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original model of water companies and immediately leads us to discuss the business 
model adopted. The restructuring of the French companies is mostly linked to 
economic and financial pressures: high debt levels and lack of investors’ confidence 
in the extent of diversification that contribute decisively in reshaping the 
management and its strategies 6  (Daniels 2002). The pace of this further 
transformation, which started at the very beginning of the year 2000, was fast and 
divestitures soon show the return to industries focusing on more sectorial 
businesses. VIVENDI sold its BTP division, which became a colossus on its own in 
the sector (VINCI), as well as creating its subsidiary in environmental services 
(VIVENDI ENVIRONNEMENT), renamed VEOLIA ENVIRONNEMENT in 2003. In this 
latter configuration, the company refocused on an expanded version of traditional 
core business, and became active mostly in water services, waste, electricity, and local 
transports.7 Lyonnaise’s path was less tortuous: after the merger with DUMEZ (1990), 
there was a further merge with SUEZ, a group active in gas and electricity, and whose 
name it subsequently adopted. Big changes occurred in 2008, when SUEZ merged 
with national champion GAZ DE FRANCE (GDF) to give birth to GDF-SUEZ and the 
spin-off SUEZ ENVIRONNEMENT (listed in the stock market, with GDF-SUEZ having 
35 per cent of the shares of the company), dealing primarily with water and waste 
management. 
 
Internationalization 
Expansion of operations abroad constitutes a key feature of French companies active 
in public services, so much so that in 2012 SUEZ ENVIRONNEMENT and VEOLIA 
ENVIRONNEMENT respectively gained 64 per cent and 59.3 per cent of their revenues 
from international activities. Tracing the process at company-level is complicated 
because it depends largely on the business sectors involved. International operations 
in the management of a delicate service such as water are definitely not the first type 
of activity undertaken outside France by CGE and SLEE (through branches and 
subsidiaries), including plant installation and engineering activities (in water-related 
sectors). If not the major pull to start the direct management of water services, the 
presence of a favourable opportunity structure existed when French companies 
began exploring abroad. In other words, a vertically integrated structure provided 
relevant resources for internationalization because of the existing skills within the 
firm in terms of organizational experiences and assets (project management, 
international networks) (Lorrain 2005a, interviews 2 and 3).  
SLEE’s international undertakings are linked to the entry of Jerome Monod as CEO 
of the company in 1979, when he sponsored the institution of a small unit created to 
explore international projects. The Eighties were a period of expansion across 
different areas of the globe from Spain and the UK in Europe to the United States 
and East Asia (Macao). The international debut of CGE came in later years, but it was 
in the Nineties that international presence boomed, also due to liberalization and 
privatization processes in different parts of the globe. Latin America is possibly the 
                                                        
6  Daniels N. (2002), Les priorités de Fourtou, sécuriser les finances et définir une stratégie, in «Le Figaro», 
04.07.2002 
7 Other activities include HVAC (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning), street lighting, facility 
management. 
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most striking example: in less than a decade SLEE/SUEZ started activities in major 
cities such as Buenos Aires, Santiago and La Paz. In parallel, CGE/VIVENDI was 
awarded contracts in China (Chengdu) and started operating in sub-Saharan Africa.    
Tools of this process are heterogeneous. In some cases, French companies acquired 
local companies active in water services (VIVENDI’s acquisition of CHEMATRON in 
South Africa, now VEOLIA WATER SYSTEMS). Elsewhere, the contract roughly 
reproduced the model of the concession, such as with LYONNAISE’s activities in 
Macao. This latter experience also shows how large contracts abroad are won and 
managed through the creation of joint ventures with companies that are either local 
or already operating in the area. 8  French companies, also in order to limit the 
exposure in terms of debt, entered design, build and operate (DBO) and 
management contracts 9  as well 10 . This method is typical of the strategy, which 
VEOLIA adopted in several US cities, implemented through its subsidiaries. 
European operations show well this diversity at work, which can be illustrated by 
two “national” examples related to SUEZ’s activities. In Spain, LYONNAISE acquired 
shares of AGUAS DE BARCELONA (AGBAR) in 1979 and currently detains 75 per cent 
of its shares. Besides the water service in Barcelona, AGBAR is present in 10 other 
countries, and the Barcelona company is currently used as the face of the company in 
important operations in Latin America (but also in other continents), where some of 
AGBAR’s organisational assets (ranging from specific skills in complex technical 
processes such as desalination to knowledge of the language) are particularly 
precious. Some of VEOLIA’s operations in that region are also done through a joint 
venture involving PROACTIVA with Spanish FCC (FOMENTO DE CONSTRUCCIONES Y 
CONTRATAS).  
SUEZ’s presence in Italy presents some peculiar features, and is mostly focused 
around its role as a shareholder in ACEA (currently detaining about 13 per cent of the 
shares)11. Together with ACEA, SUEZ’s subsidiary in Italy, ONDEO ITALIA, holds shares 
in companies managing the water, such as NUOVE ACQUE SPA (ATO 4 Arezzo), 
PUBLIACQUA SPA (ATO 3 Florence) and ACQUE SPA (ATO 2 Pisa).  
GDF-SUEZ’s activities in ACEA are not confined to water, but also involve electricity 
and gas. In the electricity sector, the joint venture between ELECTRABEL (partly 
owned by SUEZ) and ACEA to manage the electricity business (upstream and 
downstream) dates back to 2002. However, in 2010 the joint venture dissolved and 
electric power plants were given to GDF-SUEZ, allegedly because of different ways in 
which the two groups perceived the evolution of the joint activities, with GDF-SUEZ 
willing to invest more in the gas infrastructure and ACEA’s majority shareholder (the 
municipality of Rome) and the other relevant shareholder (the entrepreneur 
                                                        
8  In the case of Macao, the joint venture is between LYONNAISE/SUEZ and Hong Kong's NWS 
Holdings.  
9 Management contracts involve a company that outsources some of its functions (which is unable to 
perform efficiently on its own) to another company to which it pays a fee.  
10 Several types of contract exist for the water sector. For a more complete view, see for instance the 
World Bank’s list, available at:  
http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/agreements/concessions-bots-dbos 
11 As of November 2013, SUEZ ENVIRONNEMENT detains 8.32 per cent of the shares, and GDF-SUEZ 
detains 4.99 per cent.  
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Caltagirone) less inclined to do so 12  (interview 4). In the gas sector, intense 
relationships and common plans also came to an end between 2009 and 2010, with 
ACEA and GDF-SUEZ resorting to an international arbitrator and then managing their 
activities13 more autonomously. The examples above show the significant weight of 
French companies such as GDF-SUEZ in shaping governance and strategies of foreign 
partners, including those that constitute the object of the present article.  
 
Politics and the firm in France 
Providing local public services is a densely political form of business, and France 
makes no exception. The narrative above, however, shows that two private 
companies are key actors, while the reconstruction of their major activities and 
evolution over time highlights how the French transnational companies in the sector 
benefited from a regulation that was stable over time and allowed private business to 
make profits in the provision of public services. Therefore, the question is: how do 
politics and firms interact? With reference to the centre-periphery dimension, French 
companies are national private companies that have been transforming into 
multinational private groups. They are also a classic example of national champions, 
as is the case for CAISSE DES DÉPÔTS ET CONSIGNATIONS and other French investors 
(among whom, ÉLECTRICITÉ DE FRANCE, where the French State has 85 per cent of 
shares), are or have been until recently some of the major shareholders of VEOLIA, 
and following the divestiture from VIVENDI there has been a hot debate on the need 
to maintain the company in French hands (Lorrain 2005b).  
The companies’ links with national politics are not limited to shareholding or 
brokering agreements over major governance transformations, but also involve elites’ 
pantouflage, with frequent movements from posts in the État to management posts in 
private companies. This, consistently with a French tradition (Suleiman 1975) 
happens both at high levels and for the middle management. For instance, the 
abovementioned Monot, before joining SLEE, was directing DATAR (Délégation 
Interministérielle à l'Aménagement du Territoire et à l'Attractivité Régionale), an important 
French ministerial department in charge of regional planning (and his new team at 
SLEE had similar career patterns, Lorrain 2005a).  
This does not mean that local politics is absent: reforms undertaken since the 80s 
have actually increased their role, as these changes provided new tools to manage 
services, thereby strengthening the pouvoir périphérique (Grémion 1976). While 
municipalities, for instance, have traditionally been in charge of the provision of 
water services, the number of SPL (Sociétés publiques locales) and SEML (Sociétés d'économie 
mixte locales) dealing with several aspects in local development and territorial 
governance has seen an increase: rising from about 600 in the late 70s to more than 
1000 stably active in the last two decades of the 20th century (Lorrain et al.  2002). 
These tools also combine with several forms of inter-municipal cooperation and 
provide relevant tools for municipalities to organize the services they provide 
without recurring either totally or in part to private companies, also by overcoming 
economies of scale-related problems.   
                                                        
12 Serafini L. (2009), Suez-Gdf rinuncia a Roma, in «Il Sole 24 Ore», 22.07.2009. 
13 Serafini L., (2011), Gdf non molla la presa su Acea, in «Il Sole 24 Ore», 27.03.2011. 
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One of the major features of the French system for the provision of public services 
is modularity, which is confirmed by the fact that these tools often juxtapose and 
overlap for different modules of the service. The water service in Paris, from 1987 to 
2009, was managed by a combination of public and private actors: production, 
transportation and quality of water were managed by the publicly-owned EAU DE 
PARIS, while maintenance, distribution and extension of the service were delegated to 
private operators (VEOLIA’s subsidiary on the Right Bank of the Seine and SUEZ’s 
subsidiary on the LEFT BANK, see Valdovinos 2012). 
Mayors of course can use contractual tools to influence firms’ behaviour. The most 
radical is the perspective of republicisation, and with reference to this the role of 
political actors can be seen to be increased by the credibility of the threat. What 
happened in Paris, where the mayor decided not to renew the abovementioned 
contracts and proceed to entirely remunicipalise the water service, which is now fully 
in the hands of EAU DE PARIS, a case of municipal régie, is exemplary of a trend that 
had already started with early termination of the delegation contract in Grenoble in 
2001 (Barraqué 2012).  
Thus, politics does play a central role in the firms, but this role does not lead to 
organizational hybridization. Firms don’t become shareholders, they don’t appoint 
managers, and they don’t argue about SUEZ or VEOLIA undertaking complex 
operations abroad. Firms are a key part of the fabric of urban capitalism, but they 
remain clearly separate entities from local governments (Lorrain 2005b). This 
separation does not make them impermeable to political and regulatory change. The 
process of re-municipalisation, though currently more a symbol than a fast-paced 
trend, signals increasing political salience of the water issue, more attention by 
municipalities to contract terms, and potentially changes the firms’ incentives, re-
orienting their balance among their different business activities and between 
domestic and international activities. Also, the so-called Loi Sapin (law 29 January 
1993) and the Loi Barnier (2 February 1995) introduced new rules or strengthened 
existing ones in order to favour transparency and competition in the allocation of 
public services. More recent changes in jurisprudence of the Conseil d’État, which had 
been a traditional “ally” of private companies, towards the enforcement, also 
retroactive, of these laws (in particular, a ruling of 8 April 2009) created new 
pressures for private actors (Valdovinos 2012). Besides the institutional incentives, 
however, it is also the specific features of the French system of delegation that 
effectively allow increasing autonomy for the municipalities. The abovementioned 
modularity in the delegation of services and clear definitions of financial 
commitments (investments to begin with) associated with re-integrating the services 
make political choices for the municipalities reversible (interview 5).  
It is early for a sound assessment of how political and regulatory changes are 
affecting private companies. Still, what can be noticed is that French firms are 
affected by these challenges in a phase of relative “maturity”. First, size matters in 
this business, and SUEZ and VEOLIA are large companies that can afford to lose one 
contract and to make reasonable bets on new foreign ventures. Second, and relatedly, 
they have been in the business of local public services long enough to have 
developed internal skills to manage existing commitments and develop new ones. 
These skills range from engineering and management to the formal and informal 
business-politics networks that are essential in this type of business (Chandler – 
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Hikino 1997, Lorrain 2005a). While these elements are difficult to disentangle in 
empirical observation, they combine to give French companies a solid, but not too 
limited “core”, that make them resilient organizations as they face increasing 
challenges to a favourable status quo. 
 
 
4 
Marriages of convenience: three examples of adaptation to environmental 
change   
 
Municipal companies entering the market 
As recalled in paragraph 2, water services and local public services in general 
presented a double pattern of development in the beginning of the Ninetieth 
century, either through direct management (in the majority of cases) or through the 
constitution of a specialized municipal entity named azienda municipalizzata, with 
municipalities playing a crucial role in service provision and implementation of 
investments financed by the central government.  
The three firms under scrutiny represented the main cases of industrialization and 
expansion, also facing competition of national champions in electricity and gas such 
as ENEL and ENI. In particular, HERA, IREN and ACEA 14  developed as municipal 
entities progressively expanding their sectors of activity and maintaining this 
multiplicity as their distinctive feature through time, notwithstanding the great 
differences between sector regulation and markets (for a summary of compared 
corporate data, see table 2 below). This section recalls the main organizational 
legacies of these firms and introduces the key moments in their recent development. 
 
Tab. 2 – «Financial statement analysis, selected indicators» 
 
GDF SUEZ 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Revenues (mln euro) 
67923,8 79908 84478 90673 97038 
Enterprise value (mln 
euro) 113184,8264 106552,1367 105646,0194 107511,4003 95210,7367 
Dividends per share 
1,4 1,47 1,5 1,5 1,5 
Employees (n.) 
226094 183000 191900 191296 189870 
VEOLIA 
ENVIRONMENT 
     
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Revenues (mln euro) 
35764,8 33951,8 28764,2 28576,5 29438,5 
Enterprise value (mln 
29920,5086 29555,486 29546,2398 22531,0975 18207,1044 
                                                        
14 Despite its presence as water provider in Brescia, A2A, the other big firm listed in the stock market, 
based in Milan and Brescia, has not been included in the present study, for its core business is mainly 
focused on energy production, waste management and waste-to-energy plants. For an account of its 
main transformations, see Di Giulio et al., (2013). 
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euro) 
Dividends per share 
1,21 1,21 1,21 0,7 0,7 
Employees (n.) 
336013 312590 287043 258400 248805 
ACEA 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Revenues (mln euro) 
3056,181 2265,244 2480,469 3217,123 3522,752 
Enterprise value (mln 
euro) 3996,5169 4204,7055 4173,8883 3634,1725 3726,4512 
Dividends per share 
0,657 0 0 0,28 0,3 
Employees (n.) 
6387 6687 6822 7050 7179 
HERA 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Revenues (mln euro) 
4204,204 3668,563 4105,68 4492,748 4204,204 
Enterprise value (mln 
euro) 3787,4233 3806,6904 3489,7913 3859,2699 3787,4233 
Dividends per share 
0,079 0,079 0,0889 0,0889 0,0889 
Employees (n.) 
6391 6481 6491 6484 6539 
IREN 
 2008 
(as IRIDE spa) 
2009 
(as IRIDE spa) 
2010 2011 2012 
Revenues (mln euro) 
2355,634 2087,634 2600,075 3254,248 4003,654 
Enterprise value (mln 
euro) 2577,425 3122,5786 4554,5198 4304,0382 3747,8463 
Dividends per share  
0,085 0,085 0,085 0,013 0,0523 
Employees (n.) 
2610 2571 4752 4622 4567 
 
Source: Bloomberg dataset, accessed January 2013. 
 
HERA was constituted as a joint stock company in 2002, from the merger of SEABO, 
owned by the Municipality of Bologna, and other eleven multi-utilities belonging to 
municipalities of the Emilia-Romagna region, including Ravenna, Faenza, Imola, 
Forlì, Cesena, Rimini. The process of privatization led to the selling, in 2003, of 40 
per cent of shares previously detained by municipalities. The mergers with two 
important multi-utilities in the energy and waste sectors, AGEA (owned by the 
municipality of Ferrara) and META (owned by the municipality of Modena) occurred 
in 2004 and 2005. 
This series of mergers led the main shareholder, the Municipality of Bologna, to 
decrease the number of shares controlled, currently 13 per cent of the total (see table 
1). The top management has been quite stable since 2005 and strengthened HERA’s 
strategies in the gas, water and energy distribution, whilst maintaining the focus on 
waste activities.  
ACEA also followed a multi-utility pattern of development. The Azienda Elettrica 
Municipale was founded in 1909 to produce light and electricity for the city of Rome. 
In 1937, it took charge of the construction and management of water infrastructures. 
In 1945, it took the name Azienda Comunale Elettricità e Acque, ACEA and later on 
acquired from a private firm the property of another local aqueduct in order to unify 
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water distribution in the municipal area. This firm thus represents the product of a 
typical strategy adopted by municipalities to facilitate urban development: to 
concentrate activities in a multi-utility company so as to respond coherently to the 
challenges of urbanization and industrialization in their territories. 
In the years following its foundation, ACEA increased its role in the water and energy 
sectors. After privatization in 1998 (and listing in 1999), it acquired part of the 
electric grid from ENEL, in 2001. With the Municipality of Rome still controlling the 
majority of its shares, in the new millennium, important private partners have 
progressively consolidated their position as shareholders. These partners are very 
heterogeneous: one being GDF-SUEZ, and the other being Francesco Gaetano 
Caltagirone, an entrepreneur very active locally in constructions and media who now 
owns more than 15 per cent of ACEA’s shares. 
IREN is the case where we find the pattern of multi-utility matched with a regional 
territorial expansion covering quite distant and disconnected portions of territory, 
from the Municipality of Turin to the Municipality of Genoa and the provinces of 
Reggio Emilia, Parma and Piacenza. It was constituted in two steps: the constitution 
of IRIDE after a first merger between the AEM TORINO and AMGA in 2006, followed 
by a second merger in July 2010 between IRIDE and ENÌA, a multi-utility in Northern 
Emilia. 
Currently (2013), IREN’s main shareholders are the Municipality of Turin and Genoa 
through the FINANZIARIA SVILUPPO UTILITIES, who own 35 per cent of the shares, 
and the Municipality of Reggio Emilia with 8 per cent. Even though the Statute of 
IREN formally requires an obligation for 51 per cent of the shares to be public, the 
private shareholding has peculiar characteristics. BANCA INTESA SAN PAOLO, one of 
the most important Italian banks, owns 3 per cent of shares, but is particularly 
significant for the role traditionally played by the bank in the economic life of Turin. 
The other important private shareholder is an historic local bank foundation of 
Turin, namely the FONDAZIONE CASSA DI RISPARMIO DI TORINO.  
In all three cases, municipalities reacted sharply to the reforms of the Nineties by 
choosing to transform their municipalizzate into joint stock companies and agreeing to 
access the stock market, thereby obtaining ready-to-spend financial resources by 
selling capital while preserving the possibility to receive yearly dividends.  
 
 
Models of expansion and strategic decisions: M&A and alternatives 
HERA, ACEA and IREN reacted to the evolution of the regulatory framework in water 
and in other sectors by pursuing industrialization with different strategies, partly due 
to the different relationships between top managers and the Municipalities, which at 
are the same time shareholders, regulators and stakeholders in local public services. 
In the case of HERA, the expansion of the firm progressed in the 21st century with a 
series of acquisitions of other multi-utility firms in the adjacent territories. This 
strategy aimed at aggregating a number of highly specialized firms with valuable 
know-how and technology, not only in water but also in gas distribution and waste 
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management and possessing a number of relevant critical assets such as waste-to-
energy plants (Interview 6).  
Two aspects emerge as typical of HERA’s evolution. Firstly, the structure of the 
ownership assumed a peculiar feature, with the dilution of block-holding positions 
after each acquisition and the collocation of more stocks on the market. At the same 
time, the organization of the firm was centralized, with the creation of operative 
branches for the different territories coordinated at the central level and the 
integration of top managers in the governance of the firm.  
Recently, this M&A strategy expanded towards north-eastern Italy to include firms 
specialized in the energy and gas sectors and interested in competing for gas 
distribution tendering in the very near future. This was the case of the merger in 
2012 with ACEGAS-APS (the multi-utility controlled by the Municipalities of Padua 
and Trieste, already listed in the stock market) and of the present negotiations with 
AMGA (Udine). Notwithstanding these moves towards more distant territories, HERA  
did not so far consider internationalization as a valuable option for expansion, given 
the uncertainties related to market and politics in developing countries (Interview 7). 
The evolution of IREN followed a radically different path, with municipalities 
maintaining a primary position in the shareholding and a peculiar macro-regional 
presence (in Piedmont, Liguria and Emilia), with the firm organized as a holding 
composed of operative societies with distinct competences and branches, each 
corresponding to the structures of the ancestors. The sequence of M&A operations 
that led to the current setup of IREN can be seen as the result of a double input: one 
by the strategic decisions of the mayors of Turin and Genoa in the setting-up phase 
and subsequently of Reggio Emilia; one by top managers’ strategy of “going to the 
market to resist multinational giants” (Interview 8). This orientation was shared 
despite the different organizational cultures of the original firms, some more 
oriented towards enlargement in new markets (AMGA and ENIA), and others (AEM 
TORINO) sensitive to shareholders’ needs (Interview 9). 
These elements emerge in the reconstruction of the expansion process. In a first 
phase (2005-2006), IRIDE was constituted from the merger of AEM TORINO, the 
utility with a tradition in energy production and local networks services, owned by 
the municipality of Turin, and AMGA, the former azienda municipalizzata specialized in 
water provision that reunited all the water and gas networks of the city of Genoa 
after its privatization (Gilardoni and Lorenzoni 2003). In the creation of IRIDE, the 
resistance of local stakeholders and councilmen, who worried about loosening 
shareholding control over the firm, was overcome through the joint efforts of 
mayors and managers. Once consensus was reached, the value of the assets of the 
two firms was set at a high level and it was decided to maintain territorial branches of 
the new company in the different cities, notwithstanding the duplication of 
functions.  
The same arrangement was proposed for the subsequent merger with ENÌA in 2008-
2010. This multi-utility specialized in water and waste sectors was created after the 
mergers in 2005 of AMPS (owned by the municipality of Parma) and TESA (owned by 
the municipality of Piacenza) with AGAC. The latter, the azienda municipalizzata of the 
city of Reggio Emilia, inherited the know-how in constructions and in water and gas 
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distribution from the CIGA, Consorzio Gas ed Acqua, the result of inter-municipal 
cooperation in the province of Reggio Emilia.  
During this phase, the role of politics was crucial, also in extending the length of 
negotiations, which led to a negative reaction of the stock market, with the 
consequence of a decrease in the price of stocks. After the failure of negotiation for 
an operation between HERA and ENÌA for managerial motives (Interview 7), the 
approval of the merger with IRIDE fuelled an open conflict between the mayor and 
the city council in Genoa that was resolved with the obligation to grant public 
ownership to 51 per cent of the shares. 
IREN’s development was also influenced by the legacies of risky strategic operations 
such as investment on assets in central-northern Italy and acquisition and award 
procedures in Sicily. The investment in the regasification plant to be located on the 
shore facing the town of Leghorn (Livorno) had not yet been completed in 2013, 
thus producing debts and not providing revenues. One of the problems with such an 
investment was the partnership with the company ASA, a local water provider also 
owned by the Municipality of Livorno, scarcely industrialized and badly managed 
(interview 10).  Also the investments in a controversial plant for thermo-valorisation 
in Parma worsened the debt situation of IREN, leading also to local conflicts 
involving citizens and political movements contesting the construction of the plant. 
Moreover, the award of water provision in Palermo (in ATO1) through ACQUE 
POTABILI SICILIANE, controlled by IREN and SMAT, the in-house water provider 
controlled by the municipality of Turin, proved to be a failure after the bankruptcy 
of the corporation due to the inability to cover operative costs following two 
recapitalizations and the block of tariffs imposed by the ATO115.  
ACEA presents different features in its development, deciding not to merge with the 
other biggest multi-utility, but rather going for commercial alliances and opting to 
acquire little corporations in the centre of Italy, in order to diversify its core business 
beyond water towards electricity production with a joint venture. ACEA’s main 
shareholder, the Municipality of Rome, played an important role, sometimes 
favouring, sometimes vetoing negotiations managed by the firm at the top executive 
level. In the joint venture for an industrial partnership in electricity with 
ELECTRABEL, politics let the managers lead the operation through a complex due 
diligence process in 2002-2003 (Interview 4). A similar situation arose in 2007, with 
the operation involving ACEA assets on gas and the acquisition by ENI of DISTRIGAS, 
a Belgian company owner of gas infrastructures and controlled by GDF-SUEZ, private 
shareholder in ACEA.  
This operation was halted following the election of the new mayor of Rome, Gianni 
Alemanno. Similarly, the abandonment of the merger with other companies in order 
to pursue “system operations” (so-called operazioni di sistema) towards the creation of 
bigger players from the former aziende municipalizzate was due to a sudden withdrawal 
of the interest of public shareholders in the operation. The top managers of ACEA 
carried out the negotiations, as the original project involved the merger with HERA, 
the ideal partner in view of a multi-utility development in relation to the synergies 
deriving from complementary skills in the waste and gas sectors (Interview 4).  
                                                        
15 Prisco F., (2011), “A Palermo la società mista si arrende”, Il Sole 24 Ore 08.06.2011. 
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The dominant role of Rome as a shareholder and the importance of mayors in 
decision-making at the local level prove to be not sufficient for the realization of 
mayors’ projects. In spring 2012, the mayor Gianni Alemanno proposed the sale of 
21 per cent of the shares as part of the strategy to cope with the budgetary problems 
of the municipality of Rome16 and to follow the direction of the national government 
regarding privatization (see decree n. 138, 2011). The operation failed due to the 
harsh opposition of the Council, especially the Partito Democratico, and the activation 
of the Italian Constitutional Court17 and administrative tribunals18 (in particular the 
Consiglio di Stato), that contributed towards increasing the divisions also inside the 
governing coalition19. 
 
Internationalization 
 
The newly listed ACEA CEO Paolo Cuccia was behind the expansion of the company 
beyond its traditional geographic boundaries (interviews 11, 12). Similarly to what 
happened to SUEZ, though on a smaller scale, a new unit with personnel coming 
from outside the company and specific expertise was formed to deal with 
internationalization. In 2000, ACEA entered a five-year management contract (MC, 
the value was approximately 4,5 million Euro) with the Armenian Government for 
the YEREVAN WATER AND SEWERAGE ENTERPRISE (YWSE), assisted by the World 
Bank.20 This type of contract presents a hybrid nature that goes beyond “aid”, as it is 
often a first step towards further and more complex activities. Different in form, but 
similar in rationale, was the arrival of AMGA in Albania. AMGA chose to participate in 
a project funded by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to assist the GREATER 
WATER AND AND SEWERAGE ENTERPRISE OF TIRANA (TWS&SE) also because of its 
potential “flywheel effect” in opening up other opportunities in the country (interview 
3). A developmental work could lead, ideally, to a long term “concession” or to other 
works.  
A second type of operation abroad involved at least qualitatively different attention 
to the business side. In 2000, ACEA was awarded a contract to construct and operate 
plants in water treatment in Lima, Peru to sell (wholesale) water to SEDAPAL.21 The 
tender required two intertwined but separated activities and the consortium of 
companies, CONSORCIO AGUA AZUL S.A., formed to compete (and then manage) 
included, as well as ACEA, a large Italian construction company like IMPREGILO. This 
signals a difference with French companies, where various phases in the building of 
plants were conducted by vertically integrated companies. Other types of projects 
                                                        
16 Di Pillo L., (2012), “Roma farà cassa con municipalizzate e gioielli di famiglia”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 
14.03.2012. 
17 Ciaffone M., (2012), “Acqua, la consulta boccia Tremonti. Pietra tombale sulla vendita di ACEA”, 
Repubblica ed. Roma, 20.07.2012.  
18 Dominelli C., (2012), “Su ACEA nuovo stop dal Consiglio di Stato”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 25.07.2012. 
19 Cerasi G., (2012), “ACEA: la maggioranza si spacca ancora, mettete sul mercato solo l’11 per cento”, 
Repubblica, ed. Roma, 22.07.2012. 
20 This is the amount ACEA was paid for the MC: 3.43 mln $ for managing YWSE for the 4 years and 
1.41 mln $ of performance-based bonus. 
21  SERVICIO DE AGUA POTABLE Y ALCANTARILLADO DE LIMA (the Peruvian state-owned water 
company dealing with the areas of Lima and Callao). 
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included the provision of services to Bogota in Colombia (ACEA, 2003), involving the 
management of 2 out of the 5 areas into which the city is divided. Management in 
this case means “ordinary maintenance” and “billing”. More complex activities were 
undertaken in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, where the AGUAS DE SAN PEDRO 
consortium (ASP), formed by ACEA, IREN (then, AGAC of Reggio Emilia), the Italian 
construction company ASTALDI and the engineering consulting company CARLO 
LOTTI ASSOCIATI
22 won in 2000 a 30-year concession to manage the water services of 
the city (the second-largest in the country), after a bid based on the lowest tariff in 
which ASP competed with English BIWATER and Spanish URBASER. In this case, then, 
the consortium led by Italian companies directly managed the aqueduct, faced the 
(large) investments needed to transform the system, including installation of meters 
and wells, pumps, their repairs and maintenance, and so on.  
The activity of IREN in Albania shows a different type of “activation”. During the 
project on the Tirana aqueduct, AMGA decided to establish an Albanian branch, 
staffed by Albanians as well as some expatriates (with personnel coming from Genoa 
on a regular bases), to explore further works in the area, using Albania also as a 
platform to move into the wider region, specifically in Kosovo, Macedonia, and 
Montenegro (interview 13). In this phase AMGA Albanian Branch was awarded, 
together with local companies, a EU-funded contract worth about 5 million euro for 
the rehabilitation of the aqueduct of the city of Girocastro. Continued presence on 
the ground allowed access into other contracts as well, both in the construction or 
rehabilitation of infrastructures and in management support in new facilities by 
training personnel, also with field trips of Albanian workers to Genoa. According to 
IREN managers, the Chairman of the company who was then CEO of AMGA 
(Roberto Bazzano), reportedly believed that activities abroad should focus on 
business sectors where the know-how could be exported, with limited commitment 
of human and material resources and no capital investment (interviews 13, 14). 
Works undertaken under the “umbrella” of international organizations, as aforesaid, 
were welcomed as they offered secure payments. 
As from 2004, ACEA did not look for new contracts abroad23 and did not respond to 
calls for tenders to renew existing contracts. The order from the new management, 
appointed and led by CEO Andrea Mangoni (who took charge in November 2003), 
reportedly was “let’s come home, (…) as we can’t face new risks. (…)” (interviews 11, 12). 
Such a decision was not only due to the performance of foreign operations per se, as 
much as to an exogenous factor, the so-called “dotcom bubble” and the failure of 
ACEA’s experiment to enter the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
business. In previous years, ACEA had entered a joint venture with the Spanish 
Telefonica and other major companies in Italy to launch e new operator in ICT. 
ACEA’s title crumbling in the stock market and consistent budget losses convinced 
shareholders, the Municipality of Rome to begin with, that a reshape of the 
company’s top management and strategies was needed. 24  Parallel to this ACEA 
downsized its direct presence in foreign countries. If this certainly corresponds to a 
                                                        
22 Originally AGAC/ASTALDI and ACEA/CARLO LOTTI were competitors. During an early phase of the 
tender, though, AGAC’s local partner withdrew and management entrusted with the project 
approached ACEA in order to propose a new partnership (interview 4). 
23 The exception is a second contract in Peru, which was technically undertaken by AGUAZUL Bogota.  
24 Pogliotti G., (2003), Acea, con i nuovi vertici focus sul core business, Il Sole 24 Ore 25.10.2003. 
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rationalization of costs (local personnel costs much less than expatriates), it might 
also signal the prevalence of a sceptical view on developing business of the “mother 
company” that requires constant meddling in the local political arena.   
Retrenchment of IREN has been more limited and was due to a widespread belief 
that “experiences [were] too dispersive” in a phase in which internal restructuring drained 
most of the new company’s resources (interview 13). High levels of debt of the 
company, linked to the major investments in assets in Livorno and Parma and to the 
further acquisition of electricity assets (a major power plant in Turin) reduced the 
propensity to risk anywhere but in those “core” investments. So much so that the 
directive coming from the top management, similarly to ACEA, was to “sell” stakes in 
foreign participation and stop development of operations abroad. Thus, IREN’s 
permanence in ASP seems to be linked more to the rather limited opportunities to sell 
at an appropriate price for a business that is quite profitable (interviews 13, 14). An 
exception is Albania, where IREN’s objective remains to activate a concession for the 
water system of Tirana (and/or of the smaller cities). 
 
Politics and the firm 
The evolution of HERA, ACEA and IREN is revealing regarding the transformation in 
the relationship between these firms and politics. At the organizational level, 
interviews reveal the multi-utility as a complex organizational actor that not only 
cannot merely be reduced to a tool in the hands of politicians, but also cannot even 
be considered a totally autonomous actor. Interests of managers and politicians often 
mingle, leading to a hybridization of structures and logics. The orientation towards 
industrial growth and competition in liberalized markets often clashes against the 
multiple interests of political actors at different territorial levels. At the same time, 
the uncertainties related to the regulative framework may tighten the relationship 
between the firms and the regulator at national and regional levels. Furthermore, this 
process is reinforced by the fact that the know-how in water services has migrated 
from public offices to these multi-utility firms (interview 15). In this complex 
picture, strategic decision-making is the product of a combination of factors where 
financial constraints of municipalities, individual political careers of mayors and 
ministers and windows of opportunity play a role in which it is impossible to discern 
a single pattern.  
In order to understand the role played by politics, it is useful to describe the 
interactions of managers with politicians at different territorial levels. At the national 
level, such a relationship can be observed on the part of regulation and on the part of 
the abovementioned operazioni di sistema. Top managers of the main multi-utility also 
lead FEDERUTILITY, the interest group representing local utilities in the water and gas 
market. In particular since 2011, through this channel and thanks to their technical 
knowledge, these utilities have put pressure upon government to clarify the rules 
regarding tariffs and investments. At the same time, different members of 
government have proposed single operations and a more ambitious industrial project 
for the aggregation of a “big multi-utility” in the Centre- North of Italy, to be 
developed also thanks to State financial intervention, as in the case of a deposits and 
consignments fund named CASSA DEPOSITI E PRESTITI (CDP), a SPA owned by the 
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Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) that manage a major share of postal 
savings (interview 7). On this type of issue not only managers, but also 
municipalities, are involved.  
By the same token, mayors acting as shareholders can be crucial actors in building 
relationship networks among members of the partisan élites at local, national and 
regional level. Attention has to be focused on the transformation of the relationship 
between the firm and the municipalities, considering in particular the role of mayors 
and councils acting as shareholders.  
Borrowing from principal-agent terminology, informational asymmetry in favour of 
the management has increased with reference to technological know-how and 
market dynamics, where mayors can, however, still play an influential role. While the 
control over service provision through the service contracts seems difficult to 
implement by local bureaucracies in smaller municipalities, as “IREN dictates the 
composition of the tariffs to the AATO” (interview 15), the detention of a consistent 
amount of shares remains the preferred instrument of influence, while formalised 
agreements among public shareholders (patti di sindacato) represent the key to 
understanding relevant actors and interactions among public shareholders (Citroni 
2009). This mechanism emphasizes the connections between the mayors and the 
firm, leaving councilmen outside the processes that drive strategic decision-making 
and day-by-day management of the firm.  
At the same time, the pacts aim at solving conflicts among major and minor 
shareholders when dealing with strategic decision-making. Often, conflict on 
strategic decisions reflects diversity in the use of corporatized firms made by 
different municipalities. A clear distinction appears among pro-dividend vs. pro-
service mayors: depending on the relative influence in terms of share or clients, pro-
dividend mayors use dividends or dismissal to balance the budgetary position of the 
Municipality, as in the case of Turin and, recently, Genoa and Rome. Instead, pro-
service mayors are interested in promoting the industrial growth of the firm for 
different reasons: to obtain dividends for sure, but also to secure service quality and 
to better manage network infrastructures that can be sometimes crucial for their re-
election (interviews 15, 16 9, 6).  
Hence, municipalities can no longer be considered as unitary actors, but as complex 
networks of individuals acting in multiple roles (as regulators, as representatives of 
shareholders, as clients) according to (often) conflicting logics (economic, relational, 
political). In the process of industrialization of the multi-utility firms, the factors that 
contribute towards increasing their influence over firms are the concentration of 
shares and, though not paradoxically, the uncertainties linked to the functioning of 
water and waste markets. Multi-level interactions among political representatives can 
also play a role in defining coalitions aggregating each time around different stakes.  
These elements emerge more in specific contingencies, for example when the 
existing concession expires and regulatory authorities are called to put them under 
tendering procedures or to renew them. In this case, conflict between local centres 
(the big city-shareholder), and local peripheries (the small villages or provincial 
agglomerates) may arise, with peripheries willing to perform in-house award explicitly 
against the “big” company. This was recently the case of water awarding in the 
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province of Reggio Emilia, where the local authorities opened the procedure to 
move towards in-house management instead of confirming IREN25 as provider. 
 
5 
Conclusions  
 
Industrialization of public services represented one of the major objectives of 
reforms carried out in the 90s in Italy. To assess the extent of convergence towards 
the typical case of industrialized provision of public services as happened in France is 
a complex task, but nonetheless useful to shed light on some major, and more 
specific features of the Italian “model”. 
While isomorphism represents an exception, or a rhetoric artefact, policy legacies 
strongly conditioned the process of industrialization. The industrial growth of the 
main multi-utility in the Centre-North of Italy is counterbalanced by the differences 
in terms of regulatory uncertainty and lack of a clear separation of roles between 
municipalities and companies. In other words, the change in regulatory environment 
and the entrance of multi-national champions in the Italian market produced only 
slight pressure to isomorphic change towards industrialization à la française. 
Besides sheer measures of size, the main difference between the Italian multi-utility 
and the French multinationals is the hybridization of structures and logics of actions 
in Italian firms. The triple role of municipalities as shareholders, as regulators and as 
clients for service provides a number of tools that allow them to influence firms’ 
strategies, so that the autonomy of firms radically depends not only on the 
shareholding structure and the corporate governance, but also on local interests of 
political actors at different levels of government. The narratives about M&A 
operations of IREN and ACEA can be considered as two cases in point. Such 
hybridization of structures represents a case for weak isomorphism in comparison to 
French firms and a limited success in the imitation of the model of industrialization. 
Another aspect is related to the regulatory environment firms interact with. The 
instability of the Italian framework cancels a long-term perspective for utilities, but at 
the same time provides opportunities for municipalities and regions to play a crucial 
role in making decisions about the prolongation of existing concessions. On the 
whole, the relationship between politics and the firms remains very different in 
France, with respect to Italy. In the former, the absence of structural hybridization 
allows the definition of an often conflictual but still rather clear dialogue between the 
firm, acting as an autonomous economic actor, and the municipalities, acting both as 
public stakeholder and as client. In the latter case, having municipalities acting both 
inside and outside the firms allows politicians to use a number of tools to influence 
the firm, while the evolution of the regulatory framework with the national 
government and legislator often intervening on privatization and award procedures 
opens the way for a conflict between centre and periphery. What is similar in both 
cases is the tendency towards more complexity of internal markets, sector 
specialization and competitive award procedures, so that municipalities may have 
more instruments to maintain or reassess their control over services, as in the case of 
                                                        
25 Fontanili R., (2013), “L’acqua ritorna ad essere pubblica”, la Gazzetta di Reggio, 28.11.2013. See 
also the act of the Regional Authority for water and waste services Agenzia Territoriale dell’Emilia-
Romagna per i servizi idrici e rifiuti (ATESIR), del. CAMB/2013/23, nov. 13, 2013. 
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the EAU DE PARIS and of the on-going attempt of remunicipalisation favoured by the 
Province of Reggio Emilia.  
This variegated situation suggests the importance of unpacking national models of 
public service provision and looking at the specific configuration of interests and 
interactions in a given territory. 
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